In 1000 words answer the following questions below using the attached sources.
1. Given the characteristics of the cyber domain, what are some of the elements necessary to make up an effective policy of cyber deterrence?
2. Is an effective cyber deterrence policy even possible?
3. What are some of the practical problems of deterring cyber attacks and what are some of the potential solutions??
4. One way to address this question is to look at the traditional forms of deterrence when it involves conventional weapons or nuclear weapons.?Are there similarities??
5. In the nuclear era it was clear that such weapons were under the control of states ? usually great powers ? and therefore it was easier to convey intent to the adversary.?How do we do that in cyberspace?
6. Should the US policy of cyber deterrence be implicit or explicit?
74 | Air & Space Power Journal
Cyber War and Deterrence
Applying a General Theoretical Framework
Capt Isaac Nacita, USAF
Lt Col Mark Reith, USAF, PhD
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con-
strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air
University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part
without permission. If it is reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line.
Military history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of any
theory or opinion.
?Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf
In September 1870, after just six weeks of what many thought would be a pro-
longed war, Prussian bystanders jeered Louis-Napol?on Bonaparte as he was carried
to captivity in what is now Kassel, Germany. It was a fitting portrait of French na-
tional disgrace.1 Their military structures before the war and lack of strategic plan-
ning were partly to blame. National archivist Dallas D. Irvine points out, ?it (the
French system) was almost completely effective in excluding the army?s brain
power from the staff and high command. To the resulting lack of intelligence at the
top can be ascribed all the inexcusable defects of French military policy.?2 Never-
theless, influenced by the idea that France had lost due to its lack of morale that an
offensive approach would have provided, the military regrouped and refocused it-
self, this time adopting ?attaque ? outrance.? This doctrine was French military
strategy entering World War I, and it was almost immediately proved spectacularly
wrong. The French lost 300,000 soldiers in the first month of war. Yet ?the legacy of
the adoption of the offensive was even more terrible in another sense. The wanton
slaughter it spawned produced a similar reaction in all those who lived through
it?a grim determination never to allow such slaughter again.?3 Once again, they
turned to the defensive, and in the years leading up to World War II constructed the
Maginot line. The Germans simply bypassed its strong points and broke through a
weaker French line in unexpected terrain. The Maginot line is now a metaphor for
something that creates a false sense of security.
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Cyber War and Deterrence
There is a saying that politicians and generals are always fighting the last war,
which is emphasized when the weapons and characteristics of warfare are changing
rapidly. However, if this is true, it is often not due to an inability to learn lessons
from previous conflicts, but to ?overlearn? or overcompensate for the failures and
experiences of the past. In reality, this is not a learning problem but one of forming
poor implications from historical events, which leads to poor applications of doc-
trine the next time around.
The DOD now acknowledges that warfare has extended into cyberspace, and it is
my central thesis that the military often suffers from a lack of meaningful conversa-
tion concerning the problems it faces in that domain. The lack of discourse is due
partly to poorly adopted metaphors and analogies pulled from other domains of war-
fare and historical examples, and in general to a lack of rigorous strategic framing of
the problem and its potential solutions.
What problem doesn?t the United States face in cyberspace? The online world re-
flects the totality of human societal issues. Is there a cyberwar occurring? Cyber-
space is a ?contested environment,? but so is the global business market. Karl Von
Clausewitz called war a clash of wills, a political act carried out by other means, yet
also characterizes it with physical force that seems to require a physical domain.4
Some, therefore, argue that acts of sabotage, espionage, and subversion occur, con-
ducted through a different medium, but not warfare.5 Martin C. Libicki suggests the
possibility of ?sub-rosa? warfare, implying the general population may be totally un-
aware of what is occuring.6 Others downplay the terminology because what we have
faced so far is overhyped and does not merit the title. In many cases the actual ef-
fects due to malicious cyberspace attacks are less than those that occur due to natu-
ral or accidental events. There is a somewhat humorous incident in which, a year
after alleged Russian cyber attacks in Georgia, a 75-year-old woman accidentally cut
a cable with a shovel and knocked out internet access in all of Armenia, outdoing
Russia in terms of total effect.7 All of this is also compounded by the tendency to
treat all of America?s social problems using warfare terminology. We are fighting a
?war against poverty? and a ?war on drugs.? There is winning, and there is losing
but rarely a clear winner or loser.
These things notwithstanding, the DOD has already recognized cyberspace as a
war-fighting domain. But the nature of the problem is central to the question of de-
terring or prevailing in cyberspace. One source says, ?stop debating on what to call
the problem and get us some help!?8 The point is understood, but if the problem is
not, we should not expect to receive any meaningful help.
The Defense Science Board (DSB) presents some examples of cyber attack that
may be used to frame the problem. It points to Iran?s denial of service (DoS) attacks
on Wall Street in 2012?13, North Korea?s hack of Sony Pictures, Chinese intellectual
property (IP) theft, and Russia?s alleged involvement in the 2016 presidential elec-
tions. The document also refers to attacks by nonstate actors like Anonymous or New
World Hackers, acknowledging that all of these represent only a small sampling. Fears
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Nacita & Reith
include the ability of these nations to hold US critical infrastructure at risk, to thwart
American military response via the cyber domain, and to use a wide range of lower-
intensity attacks that collectively take a toll on the foundations of national power.9
The DSB?s recommendations for cyber deterrence read like a Cold War deterrence
playbook and not without acknowledgement. Its first initiative, planning tailored
deterrence campaigns to cope with a range of attacks, unmistakably resembles flex-
ible response, the concept that moved US nuclear policy away from massive retalia-
tion toward something more proportional. Its second initiative, creating a cyber-re-
silient ?thin line? to key US strike systems, even uses the term ?second strike? in a
clear acknowledgement of its nuclear deterrence forbearers. Even ?countervailing?
appears in the document, a term used during the Carter administration years to con-
vey a particular nuclear deterrence strategy.10 The analogy is not limited to the DSB,
presumably because the cold war itself is often invoked in discussions of the rela-
tionship between countries over their interactions in cyberspace.11 A recently cited
case described the suggestion to leak our cyber offensive capabilities, which takes
the idea from nuclear deterrence, that is, a secret weapon cannot be a deterrence.12
Even the question posed for this article seems to echo President Reagan?s speeches
on ?prevailing? over the forces of communism and the Soviet Union.
In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta used the term ?cyber Pearl Harbor? to
convey the danger the US faced in the cyber domain;13 others have similarly used
?Cyber 9/11.? In contrast, John Arquilla and David Rondfeldt suggested (more than
a decade earlier) a ?manifest destiny for the information age.?14 Others call cyber-
space the new ?wild, wild west? or harken the era of pirates and privateers, weak
governments, and inexplicit or unenforced international norms.15 All of these have
something in common: the desire to explain something new in understandable
terms by reminding us of the past. Cyberwar is complicated because it covers a
range of attacks; DoS attacks and leaking of Democratic National Party documents
represent two very different types of attacks and two very different strategies. The
only thing they really have in common is that both were conducted using cyber do-
main tools and directed at the US.
Scholars have noted that metaphor is an essential part of how humans rationalize
and understand the world, not just in language, but also thought processes.16 Chris-
topher R. Paparone argues that ?management of meaning? is a primary task for
leaders.17 They are often the best way to frame the narrative, but with the obvious
problem of oversimplification. A na?ve translation of nuclear deterrence principles
into cyberspace, therefore, obscures the real problems we face.18 Metaphors ?carry
with them, often covertly and insidiously, natural ?solutions.? ?19 Computer viruses
resemble biological viruses, so some have suggested a cyber version of the Center
for Disease Control.20 Online piracy, like real piracy, is a problem of establishing in-
ternational norms and compelling nations to enforce them.21 These are perhaps two
of the better ideas, but they also show that the method of framing the problem af-
fects the way the solution is formulated. Winston Churchill?s iron curtain descrip-
tion painted a visceral image in Western minds that helped to shape the policy of
containment under the Eisenhower administration. References to an ?information
curtain? or ?tearing down this firewall? lack the same vitality.22
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Cyber War and Deterrence
Paparone discusses categories of metaphor used by leaders: Newtonian, post-
Newtonian, and Humanities and Arts.23 Newtonian metaphors are based in the hard
sciences, and tend to be deterministic in character. Military doctrine derives many
of its concepts from Newtonian terminology, such as mass, friction, center of gravity,
and power, which carry a quantitative quality. In contrast, post-Newtonian meta-
phors allude to the complexity and mutual interaction of a system, based in fields
like biology, medicine, and quantum mechanics, in which probabilistic effects char-
acterize outcomes rather than linear, deterministic ones. The terms are used exten-
sively in the cyber domain; network, virus, infection, and worm all draw parallels to
the ?post-Newtonian? world. They are also used to explain things like terrorism and
insurgency. Finally, the humanities and arts provide metaphors and analogies from
historical, literary, and cultural references. In one of the better war metaphors,
Clausewitz likened it to two wrestlers striving for dominance over one other.24
In summary, the cyberwar discussion is taking place within a language context
that is as congested as the internet itself. This problem has some precedent. Lt Col
Peter Faber, USAF, retired, argued that airpower theory and doctrine suffered inside
a similar ?prison house of language? during its development that mixed rationalist
ideals, antirationalist thought, and army terminology.25 In response, Lieutenant Col-
onel Faber suggested a framework originally conceived by Dr. Robert Pape and ex-
panded by several works at the Air University.26 This framework was intended to
generalize the ideas of airpower, but without locking it into a particular linguistic
context. Particularly, the goal of any strategy is to link ends with means. It is this
framework that I propose can be utilized to help understand how to address the cyber-
specific threats to national security that the US faces.
A Strategic Framework
The framework takes the form of six key questions in anticipation of any strategy
utilizing military forces:27
1. What outcome am I seeking?
2. What are my specific politico-military capabilities and those of the adversary?
3. What type of strategy should I pursue?
4. What targets or objectives are most important?
5. What mechanisms do I expect my operation to trigger?
6. How should I time my actions?
Beginning with the first question, the outcome sought is primarily political in na-
ture. However, it does not have to be destruction-oriented. In this case, the aim is to
stop aggressive actions in cyberspace. Yet this requires further clarification. The
outcome should be considered with respect to some receiver.28 Who should stop
conducting aggressive actions in cyberspace, and which actions should stop? Is the
political outcome that China reduce IP theft from American corporations? Or is it to
reduce the vulnerability of US critical infrastructure? Changing the formulation of
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this outcome may change the direction of the strategy. For instance, the outcome
may be stated in terms of stopping a particular nation-state from taking hostile cyber-
actions against our power grid. Alternatively, it may be stated in terms of minimiz-
ing the effects of a power system cyber attack on the functioning of society. In the
latter case, perhaps the receiver is not the adversary but the private owners or man-
agers of US critical infrastructure. We should avoid the temptation of grand, unified
strategic deterrence aims to cover all possible cyber actors and activities; such a
thing is akin to a ?land? or a ?sea? deterrence.29
Next, the comparison of politico-military capabilities. Policy, readiness, training,
domestic culture, equipment, tactics, and attribution are all applicable in the cyber
domain as in every domain. Perhaps the US holds a conventional warfighting ad-
vantage, but how ready are forces to defend networks or conduct offensive actions
in cyberspace? What about cultural strength, the responsiveness of the general pop-
ulace to an information campaign pressing a particular narrative, as in alleged elec-
tion meddling? Sun-Tzu may have summarized the importance of this question
simply: know yourself, and know your enemy.30
The third key question asks that a particular strategy be considered. Lieutenant
Colonel Faber suggests several:
? punishment?pushing a society past its economic or psychological breaking point
? risk?same as punishment but with gradual escalation
? denial?neutralizing ability to wage war
? decapitation?destroying or isolating leadership, national communications, or
other centers of power
? disabling?disrupting offensive abilities
? delaying?using threats or deterrence method to preserve status quo
? enabling?creating stability where it is weak
It now becomes clearer why language problems have often been crippling to cyber
discussions. Nuclear deterrence analogies, which have been used but found wanting
in most cases, do not usually fit because they were formulated for specific political
outcomes and specific assessments of capability. It is of course true that cyber weap-
ons aren?t nuclear bombs, but bombs were not the goal of deterrence, they were the
means that fit the assessment. A more important lesson is how, not what, strategy
was applied given the options. The delaying or punishment strategies may have
worked then; maybe a denial or an enabling strategy is more appropriate now. A
possible example of a ?cyber? decapitation strategy was the release of the Mandiant
report, which simply used well-documented exposure of the PLA to isolate it in the
international community.31 This led to international agreements, with observed de-
creases in the number of cyber intrusions since.32
The fourth key question regards critical targets and their importance. Lieutenant
Colonel Faber points out issues to consider:
1. Which aspects of the receiver?s power should be targeted?33
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Cyber War and Deterrence
? Sources ? military, industrial, cultural
? Manifestations ? government, ideological
? Linkages ? human and material networks
2. What is the generic strategy?
? Direct ? ?head on? assault, confrontation, or support
? Indirect ? reduce will to fight or alter decision making
3. What level of destruction do I want?
Clearly, the previously mentioned adversaries make the same considerations.
The indirect strategy is often assumed in cyberspace, which sometimes is trans-
lated denial, degradation, disruption, destruction, or manipulation of information.34
In a general sense, however, a target may be chosen for either strengthening or
weakening, depending on the previous formulations.35 Targeting theory forms a
large part of airpower theory and is a key aspect of nuclear strategy. The US also
often uses economic leverage to target sources of power. Cyber-targeting is a less
developed concept but was recently considered in a thesis at Air University.36 As
with airpower, the targets are endless. However, the linkage between this step and
the next is what Lieutenant Colonel Faber refers to as the ?holy grail? of airpower,
something that has yet to be completely achieved.
The fifth key question is to ask which mechanisms are expected to be activated
by the previous targeting choice. What changes or outcome should be expected?
Political division? Mass confusion, revolt, or surrender? Increased will to fight? A
key reminder from early airpower advocates is that they were often wrong; bomb-
ing cities sometimes resulted in chaos or surrender and sometimes strengthened
the people?s will to resist. Cyber power effects are similarly difficult to predict. The
2007 DoS attacks in Estonia do not appear to have achieved any lasting effect. Stux-
net delayed but did not seem to ultimately alter the direction of Iranian nuclear
programs. On the other hand, understanding the real effect of the information cam-
paigns during the 2016 election remains elusive. First-order effects in cyberspace
are easier to calculate, as they were in strategic bombing, or they may not be the
primary purpose at all. It is the second, third, and fourth-order effects that have al-
ways been difficult, and these depend greatly on whether proper attention has been
paid to question two.
Ultimately, deterrence is not a matter of thwarting technology, but of influencing
decisions. These decisions are usually specific and limited. US nuclear policy perhaps
influenced Soviet decisions to not launch nuclear weapons but did not prevent ev-
ery undesirable Soviet military action, because there is no way to guarantee human
behavior in every situation. However, one can use critical thinking and good judg-
ment to seek solutions if the problem is framed well, the desired outcome is clearly
defined, and the work to know ourselves and our adversaries well enough to make
reasonable estimates of their responses has been done.
Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Faber considers timing. Should actions be single or
multiple? Incremental, sequential, cumulative, or simultaneous? Once again, this is
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Nacita & Reith
tied to the desired mechanism. Will a single response be enough to deter a particular
actor from a particular behavior? Or actions taken on a regular basis? Declaratory
policy may work in some cases and may not in others.
It is my assertion that this framework provides a helpful, yet nonprescriptive man-
ner in which to gauge the question of strategy for war and deterrence in cyberspace.
It is not prescriptive because war is ultimately not a deterministic mathematical equa-
tion, and linking means and ends has always proved difficult. Nevertheless, it re-
minds us of a few important lessons, and helps free us from the traps of communi-
cating under a constrained set of references.
Some Final Recommendations
What then, should the US do to better prepare for deterrence and, if that fails, to pre-
vail in cyberspace? There are at least three ideas that we should grasp from this exercise.
1. Critical thinking and judgment must replace lessons learned.
They said, that to go to the gate for entrance was, by all their countrymen, counted too far about;
and that, therefore, their usual way was to make a short cut of it, and to climb over the wall, as
they had done.
?John Bunyan, Pilgrim?s Progress
The central idea of this article has been that a poor usage of language and a lack
of framing the problem has complicated and crippled the discussion of cyberwar and
deterrence strategy. Senior leaders will not and should not throw out all metaphorical
language and historical references. Our language and our history are part of our
country?s strength. Therefore, communication of the right pictures and the right
historical lessons for the purpose of formulating today?s strategy remains the goal.
This will happen to a greater degree when we commit ourselves to the hard task of
critical thinking rather than taking the shortcut of a simplified lessons-learned ap-
proach. We must learn from those who considered nuclear warfare in the 1960s, or
asymmetric warfare in the Middle East, but we should not try to take shortcuts in
our solutions. We must consider problems on their own merit, while acknowledging
the work of those before us, and reaping the benefit of strategic thinkers who
helped provide a framework for thinking well today.
2. Courageous leadership will be required.
Never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is
inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models,
game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.
?Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 2008
Decisions in war and peace are often based on insufficient intelligence, probabili-
ties, and general principles. We can reduce the likelihood that we make fundamen-
tally unsound links between our ends and our means by thinking clearly and criti-
cally and taking into account a broad set of perspectives. However, at the end of the
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Cyber War and Deterrence
day, our leaders will have to be courageous enough to listen and courageous
enough to act or not to act. We should expect nothing less. War is fundamentally un-
certain, and courage to decide will always be required.
3. Humility is key.
A generally useful way of concluding a grim argument of this kind would be to affirm that we have
the resources, intelligence, and courage to make the correct decisions. That is, of course, the case. And
there is a good chance that we will do so. But perhaps, as a small aid toward making such decisions
more likely, we should contemplate the possibility that they may not be made. They are hard, involve
sacrifice, are affected by great uncertainties, concern matters in which much is altogether unknown
and much else must be hedged by secrecy; and, above all, they entail a new image of ourselves in a
world of persistent danger. It is by no means certain that we shall meet the test.
?Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 1958
Humility allows us to do several things. It allows us to consider the past and rec-
ognize that we are not unique in facing problems and challenges of humanity. It in-
sists that we recognize and accept strategic miscalculations and change our course of
action. It gives us the ability to work with others from different fields and different
backgrounds to solve a common problem. It dictates that we defer to others who are
more able, more knowledgeable, and more informed about particular areas that we
will have to consider. It causes us to realize that complete answers and complete
solutions are not part of the realm of warfare and deterrence. Finally, humility re-
minds us that it is not certain we will be successful and so shows us that we too
must do the hard work that every past generation has faced in its own way. ?
1. Charles W. Sanders Jr., No Other Law: The French Army and the Doctrine of the Offensive, Research
Report no. P-7331 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1987), https://www.rand.org/content
2. Dallas D. Irvine, ?The French and Prussian Staff Systems Before 1870,? The Journal of the American
Military Foundation 2, no. 4 (Winter 1938): 192?203.
3. Sanders, ?No Other Law,? 192?203.
4. Karl Von Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu, The Book of War: Sun-Tzu?s ?The Art of War? and Karl Von
Clausewitz?s On War (New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 2000).
5. Thomas Rid, ?Cyber War Will Not Take Place,? Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 5?32,
6. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009),
7. Peter W. Singer and Noah Shachtman, ?The Wrong War: The Insistence on Applying Cold War
Metaphors to Cybersecurity is Misplaced and Counterproductive,? Brookings Institute, August 2011,
8. Jason Andress and Steve Winterfield, Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics, and Tools for Security
Practitioners, 2nd ed. (Waltham, MA: Syngress, 2014).
9. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Task Force on Cyber Deterrence (Washington, DC:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2017), http://
10. Sandia National Laboratories, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy: A Video History, 1945?2004 (Albuquerque,
NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 2012), https://archive.org/details/U.s.StrategicNuclearPolicy.
82 | Air & Space Power Journal
Nacita & Reith
11. David Ignatius, ?Cold War Feeling on Cyberspace,? RealClearPolitics, 26 August 2010, https://
12. Peter W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press).
13. ?Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National Security,?
Department of Defense Press Operations, news transcript, 11 October 2012, http://archive.defense.gov
14. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik: toward an American Information
Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999).
15. Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar.
16. Sean Lawson, ?Putting the ?War? in Cyberwar: Metaphor, Analogy, and Cybersecurity Discourse
in the United States,? First Monday 17, no. 7: (2 July 2012), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm
17. Christopher R. Paparone, ?On Metaphors We Are Led By,? Military Review (November?December
18. Singer and Shachtman, ?The Wrong War.?
19. Lawson, ?Putting the ?War.? ?
20. Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar; and Lawson, ?Putting the ?War.? ?
21. Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar.
22. Nathan Hodge, ?Hillary on Net Freedom: Tear Down This Firewall,? Wired, 21 January 2010,
23. Paparone, ?On Metaphors.?
24. Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu, The Book of War.
25. Lt Col Peter R. Faber, Competing Visions of Aerospace Power: A Language for the 21st Century, re-
search report (Newport, RI: Advanced Research Department, Naval War College, 21 February 1997),
26. A description of the development of this framework, as well as alternatives, is given in the fol-
lowing paper: Thomas P. Ehrhard, Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis Framework,
School of Advanced Airpower Studies (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997), http://www.au
27. Lawson, ?Putting the ?War.? ?
28. A note is important here: these strategies were formulated in the context of airpower. Neverthe-
less, the ends of airpower have always been considered strategic. Deterrence is an inherently strategic
concept, and the general considerations should apply, not only with an offensive focus, but a defensive
one as well.
29. The object of deterrence or offensive action is a person, not a technology or a domain, as de-
scribed further in this article. Faber lists several: an international organization, a nation-state, a non-
governmental organization, a terrorist network, and so forth. However, our receiver does not have to
be the adversary; it may well be an ally. An example of this is the Berlin Airlift, which sought to en-
sure West Berlin did not fall to Soviet economic pressures. In this case, the adversary was the Soviet
Union, but the receiver was the people of Berlin. Presumably, there is some adversary, but our out-
come need not be formulated in their terms alone.
30. Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu, The Book of War.
31. Dorothy E. Denning, ?Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence,? Joint Force Quarterly 77,
(Spring 2015), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/JointForceQuarterly77/tabid/12113/Article/581864/re
32. Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China?s Cyber Espionage Units (Alexandria, VA: Mandiant, 2013),
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf; and Fire-
Eye iSight Intelligence (2016). Redline Drawn: China Recalculates Its Use of Cyber Espionage (Milpitas, CA:
FireEye iSight Intelligence, 2016), https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www./current-threats
33. Once again, this is the receiver, which is not necessarily equivalent to the adversary.
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Cyber War and Deterrence
34. Curtis E. Lemay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 30 November 2011, Annex
3-12?Cyberspace Operations: Introduction to Cyberspace Operations, http://www.doctrine.af.mil/Doc
35. For example, if the receiver is the adversary, its military power may be targeted directly
through kinetic force or by cyber means. In the case of critical infrastructure, one may seek to change
for the better the network security practices of the companies that manage those facilities by incentiv-
izing or otherwise motivating better defensive practices.
36. Steven Anderson, ?Airpower Lessons for an Air Force Cyber-Power Targeting Theory,? Drew
Paper No. 23 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Pre